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GROUP HOMES FOR PERSONS WITH
HANDICAPS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE LAW
MATTHEW B. BOGIN·
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article will examine recent developments in the law of the
handicapped concerning the issue of the establishment ·of group
homes.· Protection of rights of persons with mental retardation in
this area surprisingly has been accomplished through legislation and
judicial decisions at the state level,. instead of through federal
efforts. 2
Recent cases interpreting state statutes which limit the ability of
local governments to exclude group homes through restrictive cove
nants and single-family ordinances which promote exclusionary zon
ing, will be analyzed. The article will conclude by suggesting that the
recent development of state-wide zoning legislation has been an in
dispensible tool in the process of deinstitutionalization of the handi
capped, providing a means to accomplish what so .~any people
support only in theory.

II.

GROUP HOMES

The group home concept involves the placement of small
groups of adults or children with mental retardation in homes in res
idential areas to gain the benefits of family living.3 Group homes
were developed to implement the theory of "normalization" which
stresses that persons with retardation must live and work in condi
• The author is engaged in private practice in Washington, D.C., specializing in
disability law. B.S., University of Pennsylvania, 1972; J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center, 1975. The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Bonni Fine
Kaufman.
1. See infra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
3. Group homes are also used in the treatment of persons with mental illness, juve
nile delinquents, alcohol and drug abusers, foster children, and the aged. See Note,
Group Homes and Deinsliluliona/izalion: The Legis/alive Response 10 Exclusionary Zon
ing, 6 VT. L. REV. 509,509-538 (1981). These homes are outside the scope of this article.
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tions which most approximate normal society in order to develop
their full potentia1. 4 The group home also provides an alternative to
institutional care, which has been criticized for promoting isolation
of the individual and subsequent socially unacceptable behavior. 5
Congress has mandated the concept of deinstitutionalization in
a series of statutes designed to encourage community-based services
for the persons with developmental disabilities. The Developmen
tally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (the Act) of 1975
and the 1978 Amendments established a voluntary federal-state
financial grant program providing federal aid for provision of serv
ices including community living arrangements. 6 Section 6010 of the
Act also provides that the "treatment, services, and habilitation for a
person with developmental disabilities should be . . . provided in
the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty."?
For many persons with mental retardation, placement in a group
home is considered the least restrictive setting; thus, many states
have effectuated their transfer from large institutions into group
homes in the community.8
Community groups and affected citizens, however, have fought
tenaciously to prevent the establishment of group homes in their
neighborhoods, impeding the process of deinstitutionalization and
normalization. 9 Localities have enacted zoning ordinances which
exclude group homes from single family residential areas lO and have
also required conditional use permits for construction of group
homes. I I Restrictive covenants and commercial use classifications
4. See Nirje, The Normalization Principle, in CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDEN
TIAL SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED, 231 (R. Kugel & A. Shearer, eds. 1976).
5. Ewing, Health Planning and Deinstitutionalization: Ad~'ocac}' within the Adminis·
trative Process, 31 STAN. L. REV. 679.679-83 (1979).
6. 42 U.S.c. §§ 6001-6081 (1976), as enacted by Act of Oct. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94
103,89 Stat. 486 (1975), as amended by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602.92 Stat.
2955 (1978).
7. 42 U.S.c. § 60\0(2) (1976), as enactedb.y Act of Oct. 4.1975. Pub. L. No. 94-103.
§ 111,89 Stat. 486. 502 (1975). In Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman. 451
U.S. I (1981), the Supreme Coun held that section 6010 did not create substantive rights,
but acknowledged that it expressed congressional preference for community treatment.
Id. at 18-19.
8. See supra notes 3-5.
9. Opponents of group homes fear they will affect propeny values. safety. and traf
fic and noise levels in the community. although studies have shown no justification for
their fears. ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled, Zoning/or Communi~F Homes
Serving Developmentally Disabled Persons. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 794. 796
( 1978).
10. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
II. Id.
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have been used to prevent group homes in certain residential areas. 12
Consequently, recent state legislation which preempts local zoning
ordinances has been instrumental in facilitating the establishment of
group homes.13

III.

EXCLUSIONARY TECHNIQUES

The most common methods utilized by communities to exclude
group homes from their neighborhoods are exclusionary zoning, re
strictive covenants, and commercial use classification. 14 State stat
utes, however, have been instrumental in overcoming these
exclusionary techniques. IS
A.

Exclusionary Zoning

Exclusionary zoning to prevent group homes is accomplished
through restrictive definitions of the term family in zoning ordi
nances which classify certain areas for residential use. 16 The ordi
nances exclude all households of unrelated persons, including group
homes ofmentally retarded adults or children. The Supreme Court
has held that such ordinances are constitutional if they do not dis
criminate between those related by blood, marriage, or adoption. 17
Many group homes, however, fall under family definitions if the
court chooses to construe "family" to include foster parents and their
wards. 18
Iri a recent Maine decision, Penobscot Area Housing J)evelop
ment Corporation v. City of Brewer, 19 a private nonprofit corporation
12. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
14. I P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, 3-139-3-143 (1982):
15. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
16. See Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 217-18, 364 A.2d 993, 999 (1976) (where the
local zoning ordinance defined family as "one person living alone or two or more persons
related by blood, marriage or adoption and living together as a single unit in one house
..."). See a/so Nichols v. Tullahoma Open Door, Inc., 640 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1982) (where local ordinance defined family as "one or more persons occupying a
single dwelling unit, provided that unless all members are related by blood or marriage,
no such family shall contain over five (5) persons ...").
17. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974).
18. See City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974). "Neither the foster parents nor the children are to be shifted about;
the intention is that they remain and develop ties in the community. The purpose is to
emulate the traditional family and not to introduce a different" 'lifestyle'." Id at 308,
313N.E.2d at 756,357 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
19. 434 A.2d 14 (Me. 1981).
13.
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sought an occupancy certificate for a group home of six adults with
mental retardation and two supervisors in the town of Brewer. The
zoning ordinance that applied to the property classified it as single
family residential. Family was defined in the ordinance as "a collec
tive body of persons. . . living together as a separate housekeeping
unit in a domestic relationship based upon birth, marriage, or other
domestic bond . . . ."20 The occupancy certificate was denied. 21 On
appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, the corporation ar
gued that the residents of the home, by living and working together,
created a relationship meeting the requirements of a domestic
bond. 22 The court rejected this argument, stressing the importance
of a "traditional family-like structure and household authority."23
The court also stressed the lack of cohesiveness and permanence in
the proposed arrangement. 24
The court seemed to emphasize the fact that staff members in
the group home would serve on a rotating basis, providing little su
pervision for the residents. 25 Yet, other courts have found the ar
rangements in group home living satisfactory in fulfilling "family"
definitions. For example, in Mongony v. Bevilacqua ,26 the Rhode Is
land Supreme Court ruled that a group home for persons with retar
dation came under the definition of family as a "single non-profit
housekeeping unit."27 In addition, a Georgia court recently con
strued a similar ordinance to include group homes. 28
Such inconsistent results have, in large part, been abolished by
recent state legislation which limits the ability of local governments
to zone out group homes. 29 Maine, for example, recently passed a
20. fd. at 20.
21. fd. at 20-21.
22. fd. at 21.
23. fd. at 21-22 ..
24. fd. at 22.
25. fd. The coun also emphasized the fact that the residents had no choice as to
who incoming members would be. fd.
26. 432 A.2d. 661 (R.I. 1981).
27. fd. at 664. See id. at 663 (citing JOHNSTON, RHODE ISLAND, ZONING CODE an.
xv III ( 19)( 1980».
28. Douglas County Resources, Inc. v. Daniel, 280 S.E.2d 734, 247 Ga. 785 (1981).
The ordinance defined family as "one or more persons occupying a dwelling unit and
living as a single, non-profit housekeeping unit." fd. at 735, 247 Ga. at 786.
29. Twenty-six states currently have such statutes. See ROHAN, supra note 9, at
250-51; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§36.581-36.582 (Supp. 1975-1982); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§5115-5116 (West Supp. 1975-1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-115 (1977 &
Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §163.3177(6)(f)(West Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §§67
6530--67-6532 (1980); MD. ANN. CODE an. 59A, §2OC (1979); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§5.2963(l6a)(Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§252.28, 462.357(7), (8)(West 1982 &
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statute to override zoning ordinances such as the Brewer single-fam
ily residential ordinance in Penobsco/. 30 The Maine statute is specifi
cally designed to affect single-family residential zones and states that
" 'a community living use' shall be considered a permitted or condi
tional single-family residential use of property for the purposes of
zoning."31 Group homes are to house no more than eight mentally
retarded or developmentally disabled persons and must be licensed
by the state. 32 Rhode Island enacted a similar statute which states
that group homes of six or fewer citizens with retardation "shall be
considered a family and all requirements pertaining to local zoning
are waived."33
Neighboring homeowners, however, have attacked such legisla
tion as violative of due process and equal protection. In addition,
such legislation has been challenged for unconstitutionally preempt
ing local zoning prerogatives.
In Cos/ley v. Caromin House,34 homeowners sought a temporary
restraining order to prohibit the construction of a group home be
cause it was prohibited by local zoning laws. 35 The homeowners
also sought a declaration that the state statute,36 which characterized
group homes as a permitted single-family use, was unconstituSupp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§11-2702.I, .2 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §18
1744-18-1747 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §30.4C-26 (West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§3-21-1(C) (Supp. 1981); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §41.34 (McKinney Supp. 1982); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 45-24-22 (1980); S.c. CODE ANN. §§44-17-10. 44-21-525 (Law. Co-op.
1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-24-102 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§1O-9-2.5. 17-27-11.7
(Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, §4409(d)(Supp. 1982); VA. CODE §15.1-486.2
(1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. §59.97(15)(West Supp. 1982).
30. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30. §4962-A (Supp. 1982).
31. fd. § 4962-A 2.
32. Id.
33. R. I. GEN. LAWS §45-24-22 (1980). In Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661.
the coun ruled that the proposed group home fell within the provisions of the town
zoning ordinance. and did not rest its decision on the statute. Id. at 663.
34. 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981).
35. fd. at 24-25. The home was constructed in a single-family residential zone
where family was defined as "one or more persons occupying a premises and living as a
single housekeeping unit as distinguished from a group occupying a boarding house,
lodging house or hotel as herein defined. Id. at 24 (citing Two HARBORS. MINN .. ORDI
NANCES an. 2. § 1.16 (1979)).
36. MINN. STAT. ANN. §462.357, subd. 7 (West Supp. 1983). The statute reads in
pan:
Permilled single Jami(Jl use. In order to implement the policy of this state that
mentally retarded and physically handicapped persons should not be excluded
by municipal zoning ordinances from the benefits of normal residential sur
roundings. a state licensed group home or foster home serving six or fewer men
tally retarded or physically handicapped persons shall be considered a
permitted single family residential use of propeny for the purposes of zoning.

428

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:423

tional.37 The court construed the local ordinance to include group
homes, but ruled on the constitutionality of the statute because the
home had to be licensed by the state. 38
Plaintiffs attacked the statute on the ground that it arbitrarily
and capriciously imposed "legislative will" upon local zoning mat
ters. 39 The court, however, expressed the view that the municipality
had no inherent power to enact zoning regulations because it re
ceived its zoning power only by state legislative grant. 40
The court then refused to rule on the constitutionality of the
statute at issue unless it was clearly unconstitutional. 41 Ruling that
the statute was substantially related to the broad program to deinsti
tutionalize persons with mental retardation, the court upheld its va
lidity.42 The court concluded by emphasizing that the statute's
purpose of facilitating acceptance of group homes in residential
communities justified the overriding of local controls.43
In Nichols v. Tullahoma Open Door,44 plaintiffs attacked a simi
lar statute on the grounds that it arbitrarily or capriciously impaired
their property rights by nullifying zoning restrictions which previ
ously barred group homes from their neighborhoods. 45 The court
held that zoning restrictions do not create vested property rights even
if the state statute causes diminution in property values. 46 The stat
ute was also upheld as a reasonable exercise of the legislature's
power to institute programs under the police powers. 47
37. 313 N.W.2d at 24.
38. Id
39. Id at 27.
40. Id But see Garcia V. Silfron Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d
1369 (1980) (municipalities have "home rule" power to zone which cannot be abridged
by state), em. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981).
41. 313 N.W.2d at 27.
42. Id at 28.
43. Id at 27-28.
44. 640 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
45. Id at 16-17. The statute, TENN. CODE ANN. §13-24-102 (1980), reads in pan:
"The classification single family residence shall include any home in which
eight (8) or fewer unrelated mentally retarded, mentally handicapped or physi
cally handicapped persons reside, and may include two (2) additional persons
acting as houseparents or guardians who need not be related to each other or to
any of the mentally retarded, mentally handicapped or physically handicapped
persons residing in the home."
Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-24-103 (1980) provides that the provisions of §13-24-102 take
precedence over any local zoning law or ordinance to the contrary.
46. 640 S.W.2d at 16.
47. /d at 18.
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Commercial Use Class!ficalion

Plaintiffs have also attacked group homes on the ground that
they are commercial ventures. This argument has largely been re
jected, particularly in light of protective state statutes.
In the two cases just discussed, plaintiffs claimed the houses
were being used for commercial, rather than residential purposes,
because they were operated by corporations which received money
from various state and federal agencies. In Nichols, the court re
jected the claim that the home was operating on a commercial basis
simply because it received subsidies and rent to repay the mortgage
loan and pay staff members' salaries. 48 The court in Coslley, went so
far as to say that a corporation operating a group home for profit
does not make the home commercial in nature. 49 Both courts
seemed to emphasize the family living style of the residents as the
key in determining whether the home operated on a commercial ba
sis, not, its for-profit status. 50
C.

Reslriclive Covenanls

Private restrictive covenants are used by neighborhoods and
real estate developers in much the same way localities use single
family zoning to maintain family oriented neighborhoods. Restric
tive covenants have sometimes been successful in excluding group
homes from neighborhoods,51 but, protective state statutes now over
ride them. 52
IV.

CONCLUSION

State legislatures, willing to provide a statutory framework en
abling citizens with mental retardation to establish group homes,
have been instrumental in protecting the rights of persons with
handicaps. Due to state efforts, local exclusionary ordinances can no
longer keep citizens with mental retardation from desperately
needed residential placements.

48. Id at 19.
49. 313 N.W.2d at 25.
50. See, e.g., id ("The residents interact and live as a family whether the manage
ment is by a for-profit corporation. a non-profit corporation. a religious group. or a gov
ernmental unit.").
51. Shaver v. Hunter. 626 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
52. See, e.g. . 313 N .W.2d 21 (restrictive covenant falls in face of important govern
mental objective of de institutionalization).

